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Abstract 
This paper explores the complementary use of two instruments 
to manage capital-account volatility in developing countries: capital-
account regulations and counter-cyclical prudential regulation of 
domestic financial intermediaries. Capital-account regulations can 
provide useful instruments in terms of both improving debt profiles 
and facilitating the adoption of (possibly temporary) counter-cyclical 
macroeconomic policies. Prudential regulation and supervision should 
take into account not only the microeconomic risks, but also the 
macroeconomic risks associated with boom-bust cycles. It should thus 
introduce counter-cyclical elements into prudential regulation and 
supervision, together with strict rules to prevent currency mismatches 
and reduce maturity mismatches. These instruments should be seen as 
a complement to counter-cyclical macroeconomic policies and, 
certainly, neither of them can nullify the risks that pro-cyclical 
macroeconomic policies may generate. 
JEL classification: E32, F32, F41, O11 
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Introduction 
The association between capital flows and economic activity has 
been a strong feature of the developing world and particularly of 
emerging markets during the past quarter century. This fact highlights 
the central role played by the mechanisms that transmit externally 
generated boom-bust cycles in capital markets to the developing world 
and the vulnerabilities they engender. The strength of business cycles 
in developing countries, and the high economic and social costs they 
generate, are thus related to the strong connections between domestic 
and international capital markets. 
This implies that an essential objective of macroeconomic 
policy in developing countries is to reduce the intensity of capital-
account cycles and their effects on domestic economic and social 
variables. This chapter explores the role of two complementary policy 
tools in achieving these objectives: capital-account regulations and 
counter-cyclical prudential regulation of domestic financial 
intermediation. After a brief look in section I at the macroeconomics of 
boom-bust cycles, section II focuses on the possibility of directly 
affecting the source of the cycles through capital-account regulations. 
Section III considers the role of counter-cyclical regulations. The last 
section draws conclusions. 
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I. The macroeconomics of  
boom-bust cycles 
Capital-account cycles in developing countries are characterized 
by the twin phenomena of volatility and contagion. The first is 
associated with significant changes in risk evaluation during booms and 
crises of what international market agents consider to be risky assets, 
which involve a shift from an “appetite for risk” (or, more properly, 
underestimation of risks) to a “flight to quality” (risk aversion). The 
second implies that, due to information asymmetries, developing 
countries are pooled together in risk categories that are viewed by 
market agents as being strongly correlated. Beyond any objective criteria 
that may underlie such views, this practice turns such correlations into a 
self-fulfilling prophecy. 
Capital-account volatility is reflected in variations in the 
availability of financing, in the pro-cyclical pattern of spreads 
(narrowing during booms, widening during crises) and in the equally 
pro-cyclical variation of maturities (reduced availability of long-term 
financing during crises). Such cycles involve both short-term 
movements —such as the very intense movements observed during the 
Asian and, particularly, the Russian crises— but also, and perhaps 
primarily, medium-term fluctuations, as the two cycles experienced over 
the last three decades indicate: a boom in the 1970s followed by a debt 
crisis in a large part of the developing world, and another boom in the 
1990s followed by a sharp reduction in net flows since the Asian crisis. 
Due to contagion, these cycles tend to affect all developing countries, 
although with some discrimination by the market reflecting the 
perceived level of risk of specific countries or groups of countries. 
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The main way in which the economic literature has explored the effects of external financial 
cycles on developing countries is by analysing the mechanisms through which vulnerability is built 
up during capital-account booms. This may lead to the endogenous unstable dynamics analysed by 
Minsky (1982) and Taylor (1998), among others, whereby the accumulation of risk will lead to a 
sudden reversal of flows and, eventually, a financial crisis. Alternatively, the accumulated 
vulnerability will be reflected in sensitivity to an exogenous shock —e.g., a contagion effect 
generated by a crisis in other developing countries or a downturn in financial markets in the 
industrialized world. 
Thus, in addition to the effects of traditional trade shocks, new sources of vulnerability have 
arisen. These new sources of vulnerability are associated with the flow and balance-sheet effects of 
capital-account fluctuations on domestic financial and non-financial agents and with the impact of 
such fluctuations on macroeconomic variables. Some of these effects are transmitted through 
public-sector accounts, but the dominant feature of the “new generation” of business cycles in 
developing countries is the sharp fluctuation in private spending and balance sheets. The 
macroeconomic effects will be amplified if the stance of macroeconomic policy is pro-cyclical, as it 
is actually expected to be by market agents. The credibility of macroeconomic authorities and 
domestic financial intermediaries play a key role throughout this process.  
If the fiscal policy stance is pro-cyclical, temporary public-sector revenues and readily 
accessible external and domestic financing will induce an expansion of public-sector spending, 
which will be followed by an adjustment later on, when those conditions are no longer present. 
Furthermore, during the downswing, interest payments will follow an upward trend due to 
devaluation and to increased domestic interest rates and international spreads. This trend, together 
with downward pressure on public-sector revenues, will trigger a pro-cyclical cut in primary 
spending, which may, nonetheless, be insufficient to avoid a sudden jump in public-sector debt 
ratios. 
The structure of public-sector debt plays a crucial role in this dynamic. In particular, if most 
of the public-sector debt is short-term, the necessary rollovers will considerably increase financing 
requirements during the crisis, thus undermining confidence in the capacity of government to 
service the debt. If the short-term debt is external, risk premiums will increase and the availability 
of financing may be curtailed. If it is domestic, there may be strong pressures on interest and 
exchange rates, as asset holders’ high liquidity will facilitate the substitution of foreign assets for 
public-sector debt securities. 
As in the past, exchange-rate fluctuations also play an important role in the business cycle, 
but their flow effects are now mixed, and even dominated, by the wealth effects that they have in 
economies with large net external liabilities. The capital gains generated by appreciation during the 
upswing helps to fuel the private spending boom, whereas the capital losses generated by 
depreciation have the opposite effect in the downturn. Furthermore, such gains induce additional net 
inflows when there are expectations of exchange-rate appreciation, and the opposite effect if 
depreciation is expected, thus endogenously reinforcing the capital-account cycle. The income 
effects may have similar signs, at least in the short run, if the traditional conditions for the 
contractionary effects of devaluation (expansionary effects of appreciation) are met (Krugman and 
Taylor 1978). Policy-induced overvaluation of the exchange rate, generated by anti-inflationary 
policies which anchor the price level to a fixed exchange rate, will accentuate these effects. 
Domestic financial multipliers play an additional role through their effects on private 
spending and balance sheets. Indeed, the domestic financial sector is both a protagonist and a 
potential victim of the macroeconomics of boom-bust cycles. The external lending boom facilitates 
domestic credit expansion and private-sector spending during the upswing but, in turn, private-
sector debt overhangs accumulated during the boom will subsequently trigger a deterioration in 
portfolios and a contraction in lending and spending during the downswing. At the same time, 
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banks and other financial intermediaries have inherent weaknesses that make them particularly 
vulnerable to changes in market conditions, since they operate with high leverage ratios, can be 
affected by maturity mismatches between deposits and lending (which are essential to their 
economic role of transforming maturities) and are subject to market failures that affect the 
assessment of credit risk. 
Market failures are associated with information asymmetries, adverse selection and (possibly) 
moral hazard, all of which distort risk assessments and the allocation of funds to investment 
(Stiglitz, 1994; Mishkin, 2001). Buoyant expectations and their effects on the value of assets and 
liabilities may lead market agents to underestimate risks during booms. Overestimation of credit 
quality increases the speed of credit growth. In many cases, under the pressure of increased 
competition, banks relax their standards of risk appraisal and make loans to borrowers with lower 
credit quality. This strategy is more frequent in the case of new participants in the market, since the 
older and larger institutions tend to retain the best-quality borrowers. Overall, a deterioration of 
banks’ balance sheets results from the excessive risk-taking that characterizes lending booms, but it 
only becomes evident with a lag. De Lis et al. (2001) refer to “a strong positive impact of credit 
growth on problem loans with a lag of three years”. 
Eventually, the risks that have built up are revealed in a rise in non-performing loans. In the 
absence of new capital, which is hard to raise when balances have deteriorated, banks are forced to 
cut lending even if borrowers are willing to pay higher interest rates. Protection provided by loan-
loss provisions and capital may be insufficient to absorb the adverse shocks. The severity of the 
ensuing credit crunch will depend on the magnitude of the credit boom and its effects on credit 
quality, and may be exacerbated by the fragility of the balance sheets of non-financial firms. Even 
the best-run banks may find it difficult to manage a shock that severely affects their clients. 
The accumulation of currency and maturity mismatches on the balance sheets of both 
financial and non-financial agents will be an additional source of vulnerability. Mismatches are 
associated with asymmetries in the financial development of industrialized and developing 
countries —i.e., the considerable “incompleteness” of markets in the latter (Ocampo, 2002a). In 
particular, domestic financial sectors in developing countries have a short-term bias. Domestically 
financed firms will thus have significant maturity mismatches on their balance sheets. Whereas 
small and medium-sized enterprises (SMEs) will be unable to avoid such mismatches, large 
corporations may compensate for them by borrowing in external markets, but firms operating in 
non-tradable sectors will then develop currency mismatches. A variable mix of maturity and 
currency mismatches will thus be a structural feature of non-financial firms’ balance sheets in 
developing countries. 
Domestic asset prices reinforce these cyclical dynamics. The rapid increase of asset prices 
during booms (particularly of stocks and real estate) stimulates credit growth. In turn, lending 
booms reinforce asset demand and thus asset price inflation. The resulting wealth effects intensify, 
in turn, the spending boom. This process is further reinforced by the greater liquidity that 
characterizes assets during periods of financial euphoria. However, this behaviour also increases the 
vulnerability of the financial system during the subsequent downswing, when debtors have 
difficulties serving their obligations and it becomes clear that the loans did not have adequate 
backing or that asset price deflation has reduced the value of collateral. Asset price deflation will be 
reinforced as debtors strive to cover their financial obligations and creditors seek to liquidate the 
assets received in payment for outstanding debts under conditions of reduced asset liquidity. The 
negative wealth effect of decreasing asset prices contributes to the contraction of the economy and 
the credit crunch that follows in its wake. 
Monetary policy will have limited degrees of freedom to smooth out the dynamics of boom-
bust cycles under all exchange rate regimes. In a fixed exchange rate regime, reserve accumulation 
during the boom will fuel monetary expansion, which together with falling international spreads 
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will lead to a reduction in domestic interest rates. Under a floating exchange rate, both can be 
avoided, but only by inducing exchange rate appreciation, which also has expansionary wealth 
effects. Intermediate regimes (including dirty floating) generate variable mixes of these effects. A 
contractionary monetary policy will induce, in all cases, endogenous incentives that amplify the 
capital surge. The typical instrument of a contractionary monetary policy, i.e., sterilized foreign-
exchange reserve accumulation, also has large quasi-fiscal costs. The inducement to borrow abroad 
will also be reflected in additional currency mismatches in the portfolios of either financial or non-
financial intermediaries. The opposite types of pressures arise during a downswing, thereby 
exposing the accumulated financial vulnerabilities. Under a fixed exchange regime or a dirty float, 
the increase in interest rates and the reduction in financing generated by contractionary monetary 
policy aimed at containing speculative attacks on the currency exert strong pressures on weak 
balance sheets, particularly on agents with significant maturity mismatches. In a floating exchange 
rate regime, strong pressure will be placed on agents with currency mismatches. 
The frequency and intensity of financial crises is thus associated with the vulnerabilities 
generated by boom-bust cycles. In historical perspective, the frequency of “twin” external and 
domestic financial crises is indeed a striking feature of the period that started with the breakdown of 
Bretton Woods exchange rate arrangements in the early 1970s (IMF, 1998; Bordo et al., 2001). The 
most important policy implication of this is that developing country authorities need to focus their 
attention on crisis prevention, i.e., on managing booms, since in most cases crises are the inevitable 
result of poorly managed booms. Focusing attention on crisis prevention recognizes, moreover, an 
obvious fact: that the degrees of freedom of the authorities are greater during booms than during 
crises. The way crises are managed is not irrelevant, however. In particular, different policy mixes 
may have quite different effects on economic activity and employment, as well as on the domestic 
financial system (ECLAC, 2002; Ffrench-Davis and Larraín, 2002, and Ocampo, 2002b). 
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II. Capital-account regulations 
A. The dual role of capital-account 
regulations 
As we have seen, the accumulation of risks during booms will 
depend not only on the magnitude of private and public-sector debts 
but also on the maturity and currency mismatches on the balance 
sheets. Capital-account regulations thus potentially have a dual role: as 
a macroeconomic policy tool which provides some room for counter-
cyclical monetary policies that smooth out debt ratios and spending; 
and as a “liability policy” to improve private-sector external debt 
profiles. Complementary liability policies should also be adopted, 
particularly to improve public-sector debt profiles. The emphasis on 
liability structures rather than on national balance sheets recognizes the 
fact that, together with liquid assets (particularly, international 
reserves), they play an essential role when countries face liquidity 
constraints; other assets play a secondary role in this regard. 
Viewed as a macroeconomic policy tool, capital-account 
regulations aim at the direct source of boom-bust cycles: unstable 
capital flows. If they are successful, they will provide some room to 
“lean against the wind” during periods of financial euphoria through 
the adoption of a contractionary monetary policy and/or reduced 
appreciation pressures. If effective, they will also reduce or eliminate 
the quasi-fiscal costs of sterilized foreign-exchange accumulation. 
During crises, they provide “breathing space” for expansionary  
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monetary policies. In both cases, capital-account regulations improve the authorities’ ability to mix 
additional degrees of monetary independence with a more active exchange rate policy. 
Viewed as a liability policy, capital-account regulations recognize the fact that the market 
rewards sound external debt profiles (Rodrik and Velasco, 2000). This reflects the fact that, during 
times of uncertainty, the market responds to gross (rather than merely net) financing requirements, 
which means that the rollover of short-term liabilities is not financially neutral. Under these 
circumstances, a maturity profile that leans towards longer-term obligations will reduce domestic 
liquidity risks. This indicates that an essential component of economic policy management during 
booms should be measures to improve the maturity structures of both the private and public sectors’ 
external and domestic liabilities. On the equity side, foreign direct investment (FDI) should be 
preferred to portfolio flows, as the former has proved in practice to be less volatile than the latter. 
Both types of equity flows have the additional advantage that they allow all risks associated with 
the business cycle to be shared with foreign investors, and FDI may bring parallel benefits (access 
to technology and external markets). These benefits should be balanced against the generally higher 
costs of equity financing. 
B. Innovations in capital-account regulations in the 1990s 
A great innovation in this sphere during the 1990s was unquestionably the establishment of 
an unremunerated reserve requirement (URR) for foreign-currency liabilities in Chile and 
Colombia. The advantage of this system is that it created a simple, non-discretionary and preventive 
(prudential) price-based incentive that penalizes short-term foreign-currency liabilities more 
heavily. The corresponding levy has been significantly higher than the level that has been suggested 
for an international Tobin tax: about 3% in the Chilean system for one-year loans, and an average of 
13.6% for one-year loans and 6.4% for three-year loans in Colombia in 1994-1998. As a result of a 
reduced supply of external financing since the Asian crisis, the system was phased out in both 
countries. Other capital-account regulations complemented reserve requirements, particularly one-
year minimum stay requirements for portfolio capital (lifted in May 2000) and approval (subject to 
minimum requirements) for the issuance of ADRs and similar instruments in Chile, as well as direct 
regulation of portfolio flows in Colombia. 
The effectiveness of reserve requirements has been subject to a great deal of controversy.1 
There is broad agreement on the fact that they were effective in reducing short-term debt flows and 
thus in improving or maintaining good external debt profiles. However, in contrast to this positive 
view of these regulations as a liability policy, there have been widespread controversies about their 
effectiveness as a macroeconomic policy tool. This question has been made more complex by the 
fact that neither country was free from the strong pressures generated by the external financing 
cycle that emerging economies faced during the 1990s, or from the effects of pro-cyclical 
macroeconomic policies (Ocampo, 2002b). 
However, judging from the solid evidence that exists with respect to the sensitivity of capital 
flows to interest rate spreads in both countries, it can be asserted that reserve requirements do 
influence the volume of capital flows at given interest rates.2 This may reflect the fact that national 
firms’ access to external funds is not independent from their maturities —i.e., that the substitution 
                                                 
1  For documents which support the effectiveness of these regulations in Chile, see Agosin (1998); Agosin and Ffrench-Davis (2001); 
Larraín et al. (2000); Le Fort and Lehman (2000), and Palma (2002). For a more mixed view, see Ariyoshi et al. (2000); De Gregorio 
et al. (2000); Laurens (2000), and Valdés-Prieto and Soto (1998). Similarly, for strong views on their positive effects in Colombia, 
see Ocampo and Tovar (1998 and 1999), and Villar and Rincón (2002), and for a more mixed view, Cárdenas and Barrera (1997), 
and Cárdenas and Steiner (2000). 
2  Indeed, evidence on the insensitivity of the volume of capital flows to capital-account regulations comes from econometric analysis 
in which unremunerated reserve requirement (URR) is not included as a determinant of interest rate spreads but rather as an 
additional factor affecting capital flows. This may be seen as an inadequate econometric specification. 
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effect between short and long-term finance is imperfect on the supply side— and/or that available 
mechanisms for evading or eluding regulations may be costly.3 In any case, a significant part of the 
history of these regulations, particularly in Chile, was associated with the closing of regulatory 
loopholes.4 Alternatively, the URR allows authorities to maintain higher domestic interest rates at a 
given level of capital inflows and, thus, of the money supply. Thus, in broader terms, the usefulness 
of reserve requirements as a macroeconomic policy tool will depend on the ability to affect capital 
flows, domestic interest rates or both, with the particular combination subject to policy choice.5  
To the extent that capital flows affect the supply of foreign exchange, exchange rates may also be 
affected. Given the multiple channels through which the URR can affect the economy, the 
effectiveness of these regulations can be best measured by a broad index of “monetary pressures” 
that includes capital inflows, domestic interest rates and exchange rates. This is the procedure  
used below. 
In Colombia, where these regulations were modified more extensively over the 1990s, there 
is strong evidence that increases in reserve requirements reduced flows (Ocampo and Tovar, 1998 
and 1999) or, alternatively, were effective in increasing domestic interest rates (Villar and Rincón, 
2002). Similar evidence is available for Chile (see Larraín et al., 2000, and LeFort and Lehman, 
2000, and for interest rate spreads, De Gregorio et al., 2000). The evidence of effects on exchange 
rates is more mixed, though this may reflect the difficulties inherent in exchange rate modelling 
(Williamson, 2000, chapter 4). 
Some problems in the management of these regulations were associated with changes in the 
relevant policy parameters. The difficulties experienced in this connection by the two countries 
differed. In Chile, the basic problem was the variability of the rules pertaining to the exchange rate, 
since the lower limits of the exchange rate bands were changed on numerous occasions before the 
exchange rate was allowed to float in September 1999. During capital account booms, this gave rise 
to a “safe bet” for agents bringing in capital, since when the exchange rate neared the floor of the 
band (in pesos per dollar), the probability that the floor would be adjusted downward was high. In 
Colombia, the main problem was the frequency of the changes made in reserve requirements. 
Changes foreseen by the market sparked speculation, thereby diminishing the effectiveness of such 
measures for some time following the requirements’ modification. It is interesting to note that in 
both countries reserve requirements were seen as a complement to, rather than as a substitute for, 
other macroeconomic policies, which were certainly superior in Chile. In particular, the 
expansionary and contractionary phases of monetary policy were much more marked in Colombia, 
and this country’s fiscal position deteriorated throughout the decade. 
Malaysia has also provided major innovations in the area of capital-account regulations in the 
1990s. In January 1994, this country prohibited non-residents from buying a wide range of domestic 
short-term securities and established other limitations on short-term inflows; these restrictions were 
lifted later in the year. These measures also had a preventive focus, but were quantitative rather than 
price-based. They proved highly effective, indeed superior in terms of reducing capital flows and 
asset prices than the Chilean regulations (Palma, 2002). They also improved the country’s debt 
profile (Rodrik and Velasco, 2000). However, after they were lifted, a new wave of debt 
accumulation and asset price increases developed, though the debt profile was kept at more 
                                                 
3  Some of these mechanisms, such as the use of hedging, enable investors to cover some of the effects of these regulations, but in large 
part this is done by transferring risks (and, more specifically, the risk associated with longer-term financing) to other agents who 
would only be willing to assume them at an adequate reward. More generally, if there is no stable external demand for the domestic 
currency, hedging may be available only in limited quantities, a fact that affects the maturities and costs involved. 
4  In Brazil, some authors have argued that capital-account regulations, which included a mechanism similar to the URR (direct 
taxation of capital flows), were ineffective due to widespread loopholes associated with the existence of sophisticated domestic 
financial instruments (Ariyoshi et al., 2000; García and Valpassos, 2000). However, they provide no statistical evidence comparable 
to that which is available for Chile and Colombia. 
5  This is the very apt interpretation provided by Williamson (2000). Indeed, under this interpretation, the conflicting evidence on the 
Chilean system largely disappears. 
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prudential levels than in other Asian countries that were hit by the crisis in 1997 (Kaplan and 
Rodrik, 2001, Palma, 2002). 
An additional innovation came with the Asian crisis. In September 1998, Malaysia 
established strong restrictions on capital outflows. The main objective was the elimination of 
offshore trading of the local currency —i.e., the segmentation of its demand, to be accomplished by 
restricting its use to domestic operations by residents. Ringgit deposits abroad were made illegal, 
and it was determined that those held abroad by nationals had to be repatriated. Trade transactions 
had to be settled in foreign currency. It was also decided that ringgit deposits in the domestic 
financial system held by non-residents would not be convertible into a foreign currency for a year. 
In February 1999, this regulation was replaced by an exit levy on the principal, with a decreasing 
rate for investments held for a longer period and no tax on those held for more than a year. For new 
capital inflows, an exit tax on capital gains was established, with a higher rate for capital that stayed 
less than a year (30%; 10% otherwise). The exit tax was reduced to a flat 10% in September 1999; 
in January 2001 it was decided that it would henceforth apply only to portfolio flows held less than 
a year, and in May 2001 it was eliminated altogether. 
Significant discussions have taken place on the effects of these controls. Kaplan and Rodrik 
(2001) have provided the strongest argument regarding the effectiveness of these regulations.6 
Drawing on previous studies, they show that these regulations were highly effective in rapidly 
closing the offshore ringgit market and in reversing financial market pressure, as reflected in the 
trends of foreign exchange reserves and of exchange and interest rates. The removal of financial 
uncertainties, together with the additional room provided for expansionary monetary and fiscal 
policies, led to a speedier recovery of economic activity, lower inflation and better employment  
and real wage performance than comparable IMF-type programmes during the Asian crisis.  
This is true even adjusting for the improved external environment characteristic of the time when 
Malaysian controls were imposed, and despite the fact that the country did not receive large 
injections of capital; indeed, the initial reaction of external capital markets to the regulations  
was negative. 
Figure 1 provides a simple way to view the effectiveness of capital-account regulations in the 
three countries. Based on similar indicators used in the literature, it calculates an index of 
expansionary monetary pressures. Since a capital surge generates expansionary effects through 
three different channels —the accumulation of international reserves, an appreciation of the 
exchange rate and a reduction in interest rates— the index weights the trends of these three 
indicators by their standard deviation during the period analysed. A simple inspection of the graph 
indicates that Malaysian controls were extremely effective, both in reversing the strong 
expansionary effect of capital surges in 1994 and in stopping the strong contractionary effects 
generated by capital outflows in 1998. The price-based capital-account regulations of Chile and 
Colombia had weaker effects, particularly in the first case. Indeed, the introduction of such 
regulations in Chile in June 1991 and their strengthening in May 1992 was not accompanied by a 
reversal of the expansionary trend;7 those instituted in July 1995 had a more discernible effect.  
In Colombia, which used price-based regulations more aggressively, the effects were stronger.  
In particular, the movement in the index of expansionary pressures is more closely tied to  
changes in capital-account regulations in 1993-1997. In both countries the capital account turned 
contractionary in 1998, with the reduction in the URR having only a negligible effect on  
this trend. 
                                                 
6  See Ariyoshi et al. (2000); Ötker-Robe (2000), and Rajaraman (2001), for additional evidence on the effectiveness of these regulations. 
7  The level of the URR may account for this result. Valdés-Prieto and Soto (1998), find evidence of a “threshold effect”, which would 
explain why these regulations were only effective in reducing capital flows in 1995-1996. It must be emphasized that this does not 
imply a better evaluation of the overall macroeconomic policy package of 1995-1996 versus 1991-1992. Agosin and Ffrench-Davis 
(2001), have argued that, on broader grounds, macroeconomic management in the earlier part of the 1990s was more appropriate. 
CEPAL – SERIE Informes y estudios especiales No 6 
17 
Figure 1 





























Source:  Author estimates based on International Monetary Fund (IMF) data. 
Memo:   Imposition or relaxation o restrictions on capital inflows, respectively (the direction of the 
arrows indicates expected effect on the index). 
Imposition or relaxation o restrictions on capital outflows, respectively. 
Index = aR + be - ci 
R = International reserves corrected by log trend 
e = Twelve-month variation of the real exchange rate 
i = Real deposit interest rate 
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Overall, innovative experiments with capital-account regulations in the 1990s indicate that 
they served as useful instruments, both for improving debt profiles and for improving the exchange 
rate/monetary stance trade-off. However, the macroeconomic effects depended on the strength of 
the regulation and were, in any case, temporary, operating as “speed bumps” rather than as 
permanent restrictions, to use Palma’s (2002) expression. The basic advantages of the price-based 
instrument used by Chile and Colombia are its simplicity, non-discretionary character and, as we 
will see in the following section, neutral effect on corporate borrowing decisions. The more 
quantitative-type Malaysian systems had stronger short-term macroeconomic effects. 
In any case, it must be emphasized that these systems were designed for countries that chose 
to be integrated into international capital markets. In fact, in the case of Colombia, the transition 
from the old type of exchange controls to price-based capital-account regulations was, in effect, a 
liberalization of the capital account, as reflected in the increased sensitivity of capital flows to 
interest arbitrage incentives (Ocampo and Tovar, 1998).8 
Traditional exchange controls and capital-account regulations may thus be superior if the 
policy objective is to significantly reduce domestic macroeconomic sensitivity to international 
capital flows. The Indian evidence provides an alternative successful experience in this regard. 
Despite the slow and cautious liberalization that has taken place in India since the early 1990s, this 
country still largely relies on quantitative restrictions on flows: overall quantitative ceilings, 
minimum maturities for external borrowing and end-use restrictions (most of which have been 
liberalized in recent years), together with the prohibition of borrowing in foreign currencies by non-
corporate residents; direct regulations (including, in some instances, explicit approval) of portfolio 
flows in the case of non-residents, as well as of ADRs and investments abroad by domestic 
corporations; some sectoral restrictions on FDI; and minimum maturities and interest rate 
regulations on deposits by non-resident Indians (Reddy, 2001; Habermeier, 2000; Rajaraman, 2001; 
Nayyar, 2002). In any case, it must be underscored that, despite the reduced sensitivity to the Asian 
crisis and the increased macroeconomic autonomy that this system has allowed, India has not been 
entirely detached from external financing cycles. 
In contrast to the successful experiences previously analysed, crisis-driven quantitative 
controls generate serious credibility issues and may be ineffective, as a strong administrative 
capacity is essential for any capital account regime to be effective. This implies that a tradition of 
regulation may be necessary, and that permanent regulatory regimes that are tightened or loosened 
through the cycle may be superior to the alternation of different (even opposite) capital account 
regimes. In broader terms, this means that it is essential to maintain the autonomy to impose capital-
account regulations and thus the freedom to re-impose controls if necessary (Ocampo, 2002a and 
2002b; Rajaraman, 2001; Reddy, 2001). This is indeed a corollary of the incomplete nature of 
international financial governance (Ocampo, 2002a) and a basic lesson of the Malaysian experience. 
Also, traditional quantitative capital-account regulations and direct approval of sensitive flows 
(external portfolio flows, issuance of ADRs and investment abroad by residents) can make perfect 
sense, if they are sufficiently well managed to avoid loopholes, high administrative costs and, 
particularly, corruption. Indeed, simple quantitative restrictions that rule out certain forms of 
indebtedness (e.g., short-term foreign borrowing, except trade credit lines, or borrowing in foreign 
currency by residents operating in non-tradable sectors) are also preventive in character and easier 
to administer than price-based controls (Ariyoshi et al., 2000). These restrictions are more attractive 
and effective when domestic financial development is limited, but they may, in turn, become 
obstacles to financial development. This may, indeed, be viewed as one of the basic costs of capital-
account regulation. More broadly, there may be inherent tradeoffs between domestic financial 
deepening and capital-account volatility (due, in part, to the dismantling of capital controls). We 
will explore some aspects of these tradeoffs in the following section. 
                                                 
8  This is captured in other studies (Cárdenas and Steiner, 2000) through the use of a dummy variable for the period during which the 
URR was in place, and has been interpreted (inaccurately, according to the alternative view presented in the text) as evidence against 
the effectiveness of regulations. 
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Certain types of regulations on current-account transactions (export surrender requirements 
or the obligation to channel trade transactions through certain approved intermediaries) and an 
effective segmentation of the market for financial instruments denominated in the domestic 
currency may be essential to guarantee the effectiveness of regulations. This implies a need to avoid 
or strongly regulate the internationalization of the domestic currency, as well as a highly 
conservative approach to domestic financial dollarization (Reddy, 2001). These are, in fact, 
common features of the four case studies considered above and, in the case of Malaysia, achieving 
this objective involved dismantling the offshore market for the domestic currency. 
It should be emphasized again that capital-account regulations should always be seen as an 
instrument that, by providing additional degrees of freedom to the authorities, facilitates the adoption 
of sensible counter-cyclical macroeconomic policies. Thus, it can never be a substitute for them. 
C. Complementary liability policies 
Prudential regulation and supervision can, in part, be substituted for capital-account 
regulations. Indeed, the distinction between capital controls and prudential regulations affecting 
cross-border flows is not clear cut. In particular, higher liquidity (or reserve) requirements for the 
financial system’s foreign-currency liabilities can be established, and domestic lending to firms 
operating in non-tradables sectors that have substantial foreign-currency liabilities can be 
discouraged through more stringent regulatory provisions. 
The main problem with these options is that they only indirectly affect the foreign-currency 
liabilities of non-financial agents and, indeed, may encourage them to borrow directly abroad. 
Accordingly, they need to be supplemented with other regulations, including rules on the types of 
firms that can borrow abroad and prudential ratios with which they must comply; restrictions on the 
terms of corporate debts that can be contracted abroad (minimum maturities and maximum 
spreads); public disclosure of the short-term external liabilities of firms; regulations requiring rating 
agencies to give special weight to this factor; and tax provisions applying to foreign-currency 
liabilities (e.g., no or only partial deductions for interest payments on international loans).9 Some of 
the most important regulations of this type concern external borrowing by firms operating in non-
tradables sectors. A simple rule that should be considered is the strict prohibition of foreign 
borrowing by non-financial firms without income in foreign currency or restrictions on the 
maturities (only long-term) or end use (only investment) of such borrowing. 
Price-based capital-account regulations may thus be a superior alternative and may be 
simpler to administer than an equivalent system based on prudential regulations plus additional 
policies aimed at non-financial firms. Among their virtues, vis-à-vis prudential regulation and 
supervision, we should also include the fact that they are price-based (some prudential regulations, 
such as prohibitions on certain types of operations, are not), non-discretionary (whereas prudential 
supervision tends to be discretionary in its operation) and neutral in terms of the choice made by 
corporations between foreign-currency-denominated borrowing in the domestic market vs. the 
international market. Indeed, equivalent practices are used by private agents, such as the selling fees 
imposed by mutual funds on investments held for a short period, in order to discourage short-term 
holdings (J.P. Morgan, 1998, p. 23). 
In the case of the public sector, specific legal limits and regulations are required. The direct 
approval of borrowing and the establishment of minimum maturities and maximum spreads by the 
Ministry of Finance or the central bank may be the best liability policy. Provisions of this  
sort should cover the central administration as well as autonomous public-sector agencies and  
sub-national governments (ECLAC, 1998, chapter VIII). Such regulations should apply to both 
                                                 
9  For an analysis of these issues, see World Bank (1999), and Stiglitz and Bhattacharya (2000). 
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external and domestic public-sector liabilities. The most straightforward reason for this is that 
residents holding short-term public-sector securities have, in periods of external or domestic 
financial instability, other options besides rolling over the public sector debt, including capital 
flight. This is even clearer if foreigners are allowed to purchase domestic public-sector securities. 
Thus, when gross borrowing requirements are high, the interest rate will have to increase to 
make debt rollovers attractive. Higher interest rates are also immediately reflected in the budget 
deficit, thereby rapidly changing the trend in the public-sector debt, as happened in Brazil prior to 
the 1999 crisis. In addition, rollovers may be viable only if risks of devaluation or future interest 
rate hikes can be passed on to the government, which generates additional sources of 
destabilization. Mexico’s widely publicized move in 1994 to replace peso-denominated securities 
(Treasury Certificates, or Cetes) with dollar-denominated bonds (Tesobonos), which was one of the 
crucial factors in the crisis that hit the country late in that year, was no doubt facilitated by the 
short-term profile of Cetes (Sachs et al., 1996; Ros, 2001). The short-term structure of Brazil’s debt 
is also the reason why, after late 1997, fixed-interest bonds were swiftly replaced by variable-rate 
and dollar-denominated securities, which cancelled out the improvements that had been made in the 
public debt structure in previous years. It is important to emphasize that, despite its fiscal 
deterioration, no substitution of a similar magnitude was observed in Colombia during the  
1998-1999 crisis; this country’s tradition of issuing public-sector securities with a minimum one-
year maturity is a significant part of the explanation (see figure 2). 
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Thus, a sound maturity profile for the domestic public-sector debt is an essential complement 
to a sound public and private external debt profile in reducing the degree of vulnerability to capital-
account shocks. Furthermore, on strictly prudential grounds, external borrowing by the public sector 
generates currency mismatches (except for public-sector firms operating in tradables sectors) and 
should thus be avoided. However, this principle should not be translated into simple prohibitions for 
two different reasons. 
The first one is macroeconomic in character. To the extent that external private capital flows 
are pro-cyclical, it is reasonable for the public sector to follow a counter-cyclical debt structure 
strategy. This means that, during capital-account surges, it should reduce borrowing requirements 
and adopt a liability policy aimed at substituting domestic for external liabilities. The opposite is 
true during periods of reduced private flows. Indeed, under those conditions, the public sector may 
be one of the best net suppliers of foreign exchange, thanks to its better access to external credit, 
including credit from multilateral financial institutions. Such external borrowing may also be 
helpful in maintaining a better external debt profile and avoiding private borrowing abroad at 
excessively high spreads during crises. 
The second reason relates to the depth of domestic bond markets, which determines the 
ability to issue longer-term domestic debt securities. This attribute includes the existence of 
secondary markets and active agents (market makers) that provide liquidity for these securities. In 
the absence of these pre-conditions, the government faces a serious trade-off between maturity and 
currency mismatches, a trade-off that is typical of all domestic agents producing non-tradable goods 
and services. Indeed, a domestic market for public-sector debt securities with an excessive short-
term bias can be extremely destabilizing during a crisis. It may thus make sense to prefer a debt mix 
that includes an important component of external liabilities, despite the associated currency 
mismatch. In the long run, the objective of the authorities should be to deepen the domestic capital 
markets. Indeed, due to the lower risk levels and the greater homogeneity of the securities it issues, 
the central government has a vital function to perform in the development of longer-term primary 
and secondary markets for domestic securities, including the creation of benchmarks for private-
sector instruments. 
The development of such markets will not eliminate the need for an active external liability 
policy, however, as deeper capital markets are also more attractive to volatile portfolio flows. 
Unfortunately, the tradeoffs are not simple in this regard, as international institutional investors may 
help to develop domestic capital markets. Thus, the authorities must choose between less volatile 
external capital flows and the development of deeper, liquid domestic capital markets. The Chilean 
decision to eliminate the one-year minimum maturity for portfolio flows in May 2000, as well as 
the Colombian decision in 1996 to allow foreign investment funds to participate in the domestic 
market for public-sector securities, may be understood as a choice for the second of these options at 
the cost of additional capital-account volatility. Similar tradeoffs may be faced in relation to the 
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III. The role of counter-cyclical 
prudential regulations 
A. Micro and macroeconomic dimensions of 
prudential policies 
As we saw in section I the origins of problems that erupt during 
financial crises are associated both with excessive risk-taking during 
booms, as reflected in a rapid increase in lending, and with maturity 
and currency mismatches on financial and non-financial agents’ 
balance sheets. In many countries, these problems are related to 
inadequate risk analysis by financial agents, as well as weak prudential 
regulation and supervision of domestic financial systems. The 
combination of these factors becomes explosive under conditions of 
financial liberalization in the midst of a boom in external financing. 
The underestimation of risks, characteristic of environments of 
economic optimism, is then combined with inadequate practices for 
evaluating risks, both by private agents and by supervisory agencies. 
This underscores just how important the sequencing of financial 
liberalization processes is. This became evident during the first wave 
of financial crises that hit Latin America in the early 1980s (see, for 
example, Díaz-Alejandro, 1988, chapter 17) but was broadly ignored in 
later episodes of financial liberalization in the developing world. Since 
the Asian crisis, it has finally become a mainstream idea. Indeed, it is 
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now widely recognized that financial liberalization should take place within a suitable institutional 
setting, which includes strong prudential regulation and supervision. Such regulation should ensure, 
first of all, the solvency of financial institutions by establishing appropriate capital adequacy ratios 
relative to the risk assumed by lending institutions, strict write-offs of questionable portfolios and 
appropriate standards of risk diversification. Properly regulated and supervised financial systems 
are structurally superior in terms of risk management, since they create incentives for financial 
intermediaries to avoid assuming unmanageable risks. 
To the extent that the sources of the financial risks that agents assume have a macroeconomic 
origin, the traditional microeconomic focus of prudential regulation and supervision must be 
complemented with regulations that take into account such macroeconomic factors. This is 
particularly true in developing countries, where the dynamics associated with boom-bust cycles in 
external financing are particularly intense. Due attention should thus be paid to the links between 
domestic and external financing, the links among these two factors, asset prices and economic 
activity, and the links between domestic financial risks and variations in interest and exchange rates. 
The basic problem in this regard is the inability of individual financial intermediaries to 
internalise the collective risks assumed during boom periods, which are essentially of a 
macroeconomic character and entail, therefore, coordination problems that exceed the possibilities 
of any one agent. Moreover, risk assessment and traditional regulatory tools, including Basle 
standards, have a pro-cyclical bias in the way they operate. Indeed, in a system in which loan-loss 
provisions are tied to loan delinquency, precautionary regulatory signals are ineffective during 
booms, and thus do not hamper credit growth. On the other hand, the sharp increase in loan 
delinquency during crises does reduce financial institutions’ capital and, hence, their lending 
capacity. This, in conjunction with the greater subjectively perceived level of risk, triggers the 
“credit squeeze” that characterizes such periods, thereby further reinforcing the downswing in 
economic activity and asset prices and, thus, the quality of the portfolios of financial 
intermediaries.10 
Indeed, the sudden introduction of strong regulatory standards during crises may worsen a 
credit squeeze. Thus, although authorities must adopt clearly defined rules to restore confidence 
during a financial crisis, the application of stronger standards should be gradual. In order to avoid 
moral hazard problems, authorities must never bail out the owners of financial institutions by 
guaranteeing that their losses are written off up to their net worth if regulators have to intervene in 
those institutions. 
In order to take into account the macroeconomic factors affecting risks, instruments need to 
be designed that will introduce a counter-cyclical element into prudential regulation and 
supervision. In this regard, the major instrument is undoubtedly forward-looking provisions. Such 
provisions should be estimated when loans are disbursed on the basis of expected or latent losses, 
taking into account the full business cycle, rather than on the basis of loan delinquency or short-
term expectations of future loan losses, which are highly pro-cyclical. This means, in fact, that 
provisioning should approach the criteria traditionally followed by the insurance industry (where 
provisions are made when the insurance policy is issued) rather than the banking industry. This 
practice may help to smooth out the cycle by increasing provisions or reserves during capital-
account surges, thus helping to reduce the credit crunch that takes place during busts. 
It must be emphasized, in any case, that any regulatory approach has clear limits and costs 
that cannot be overlooked. Prudential regulation involves some non-price signals, and prudential 
supervision is full of information problems and is a discretionary activity susceptible to abuse. 
Some classic objectives of prudential regulation, such as risk diversification, may be difficult to 
                                                 
10  For recent analyses of these issues and policy options for managing them, see BIS (2001), chapter VII; Borio et al. (2001), Clerc 
et al. (2001), and Turner (2002). 
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attain when macroeconomic issues are at the root of the difficulties. In particular, experience 
indicates that even well regulated systems are subject to periodic episodes of euphoria, when risks 
are underestimated, as the experience of many industrialized countries indicates. The recent crisis in 
Argentina is a specific case in which a system of prudential regulations that was considered to be 
one of the best in the developing world, working within the framework of a financial sector 
characterized by the large-scale presence of multinational banks, has clearly failed to avert the 
effects of major macroeconomic shocks on the domestic financial system. Moreover, being able to 
separate cyclical from long-term trends is always an elusive task, as any process that involves 
learning will always generate path-dependent mechanisms in which short and long-term dynamics 
are interconnected. Learning processes include those associated with the formation of expectations 
of future macroeconomic events, a particularly difficult task in developing economies facing 
substantial shocks (Heyman, 2000). 
Moreover, many regulatory practices aimed at correcting risky practices on the part of 
financial intermediaries shift the underlying risks to non-financial agents, thus generating indirect 
risks that are expressed in credit risks. The net effect of regulation on banks’ vulnerabilities is thus 
partial, as the literature on “migration of risks” indicates. Thus, regulatory standards establishing 
lower risk ratings for short-term credits and reducing mismatches between the maturities of bank 
deposits and lending will reduce direct banking risks, but will also reinforce the short-term bias in 
lending. Maturity mismatches are thus displaced to non-financial agents. Indeed, in this case, a net 
positive effect of this type of regulation may be associated with an inadequate supply of long-term 
financing and reduced fixed capital investment. Also, prudential regulations forbidding banks from 
holding currency mismatches in their portfolios will reduce their direct risk, but may encourage 
non-financial agents to borrow directly abroad. The risks assumed by corporations, particularly 
those operating in non-tradables sectors, will eventually be translated into credit risk by domestic 
financial institutions that are also their creditors. 
For the same reason, stronger regulation will result in higher spreads in domestic financial 
intermediation, particularly if it results in more stringent domestic vis-à-vis international regulatory 
practices, which is a likely outcome given the stronger volatility characteristic of developing 
countries. Higher spreads will generate incentives for corporation with direct access to international 
capital markets to borrow abroad, thus increasing the likelihood of currency mismatches in the 
portfolios of these agents. They may also result in a sub-optimal supply of financing for small and 
medium-sized enterprises, or an excessively short-term bias in the supply of credit for such firms. In 
all these cases, the reduced direct vulnerability of the domestic financial sector will have as a 
corollary the maturity and currency mismatches of non-financial agents (as well as sub-optimal 
fixed capital investment), which, in any case, may become credit risks for domestic financial agents 
during the downturn. 
The differentiation between systematic and non-systematic risks that is typical in portfolio 
risk analysis is particularly relevant in this regard. The former depends on the correlation of the 
price fluctuations of each particular asset with prices for the entire market and arises from exposure 
to common factors (e.g., economic policy or the business cycle). Non-systematic risks depend, on 
the contrary, on individual characteristics of each stock and may be reduced by diversification. 
Whereas this second type of risk can be reduced by adequate regulation aimed at improving 
microeconomic risk management, the first cannot, and indeed, in the face of systematic risks, the 
use of common risk management techniques can actually result in greater macroeconomic volatility 
(Persaud, 2000). Thus, to a large extent, macroeconomic risks, which are systematic in character, 
can only be shifted to other market agents within a specific economy and are only authentically 
diversified when external economic agents are willing to assume them. Nonetheless, counter-
cyclical prudential policies can help to reduce the collective risks that agents may assume during 
periods of euphoria. They can also help to generate improved incentives for financial agents that 
behave pro-cyclically (those exposed to industries with high systematic risks). 
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In any case, as in the case of capital controls, improved prudential regulation, including the 
introduction of strong counter-cyclical components that take into account the macroeconomics of 
boom-bust cycles, is a complement but not a substitute for appropriate counter-cyclical 
macroeconomic policies. 
B. The choice of instruments for protection against credit risk 
Under generally accepted accounting principles, provisions should cover expected losses, 
though of an uncertain magnitude, and are thus registered as expenses, while reserves apply to 
unexpected losses and are part of capital. These principles also imply that banks should charge an 
interest premium for expected risk while stockholders should cover unexpected risks. Accounting 
practices also differentiate between general and specific provisions. In most countries, calculation 
of specific provisions is done on an individual basis for commercial loans and on a pooled basis for 
retail loans. General provisions are estimated on the basis of pools of loans, or the total portfolio. In 
some countries, they are treated as reserves and, as such, as capital, while in others they are 
subtracted from assets. Under traditional accounting methods, specific provisions are made shortly 
before or even after a loan becomes delinquent. In this sense, a system based wholly on this type of 
provision will not reflect the true credit risk of the loan portfolio and, as indicated above, will be 
inherently pro-cyclical. The rules related to general provisions and reserves are usually more 
flexible and allow for more forward-looking approaches in the appraisal of risk. 
In some countries, authorities (governments or central banks) take a restrictive approach and 
establish statutory rules that determine the level of provisions. In others, the system varies from a 
strict formula to statistical approaches, which use historical data, information on peer groups and 
more explicit internal risk models. Several OECD countries allow the constitution of forward-
looking provisions based on past experience and the expectation of future events. However, most of 
them are oriented towards the short term, using a one-year horizon to measure risk. 
The best-known exception to this rule is Spain, which in December 1999 issued regulations 
requiring counter-cyclical provisions calculated by statistical methods. The main feature of this 
approach is the estimation of “latent risk” based on past experience over a period long enough to 
cover at least one entire business cycle. This generates a dynamic in which provisions build up 
during economic expansions and are drawn upon during downturns (Poveda, 2000; De Lis et al., 
2001). The major innovation of this system is its explicit recognition that risks are incurred when 
credits are approved and disbursed, not when they come due. 
More particularly, under this scheme, “statistical” or actuarial provisions for “latent” risks 
must be estimated for homogenous categories of credit according to the possible loss that a typical 
asset (loans, guarantees, inter-bank or fixed income portfolio investments) in each category is 
expected to involve, estimated on the basis of a full business cycle. Either the internal risk 
management model of the financial institution or the standard model proposed by Banco de España 
can be used for that purpose. The latter establishes six categories, with annual provisioning ratios 
that range from 0 to 1.5%. These “statistical provisions” must be accumulated in a fund, together 
with special provisions (traditional provisions for non-performing assets or performing assets of 
borrowers in financial difficulties) and recoveries of non-performing assets.11 The fund can be used 
to cover loan losses, thus in effect entirely substituting for special provisions if resources are 
available in adequate amounts. If this is so, provisions actually follow the credit cycle. 
Although the accumulation and drawing down of the fund made up by statistical and specific 
provisions has a counter-cyclical dynamic, this only reflects the cyclical pattern of bank lending. In 
this regard, the system is, strictly speaking, “cycle-neutral” rather than counter-cyclical, but it is 
                                                 
11  Additionally, general provisions equivalent to 0%, 0.5% and 1.0% of three classes of assets are required. 
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certainly superior to the traditional pro-cyclical provisioning for loan losses or forward-looking 
provisioning based on short time horizons. 
Therefore, a system such as this should be complemented by strictly counter-cyclical 
“prudential provisions”, decreed by the regulatory authority for the financial system a whole, or by 
the supervisory authority for special financial institutions, on the basis of objective criteria. These 
criteria could include the growth rate of credit, the bias in lending towards sectors characterized by 
systematic risks or the growth of foreign-currency denominated loans to non-tradables sectors. 
Voluntary prudential provisions can also be encouraged. In both cases, it is essential that tax 
deductibility be granted to provisions. Indeed, accounting and taxation rules contribute to failures in 
risk assessment because, in general, they make it necessary to register events that have already 
occurred. 
The foregoing analysis indicates that an appropriate policy for managing the macroeconomic 
effects of boom-bust cycles in developing countries should involve a mix of: (a) forward-looking 
provisions for latent risks, to be made when credit is granted so that financial intermediaries will 
have to take into account the risks they incur throughout the whole business cycle, and (b) more 
discrete counter-cyclical prudential provisions based on a series of objective criteria. Specific 
provisions should be managed together with forward-looking provisions, as in the Spanish system. 
As we will see in the following sections, these provisions should be supplemented by regulations in 
other areas. Reserves or general provisions play a less clear role and in fact are not distinguishable 
from the role of capital in covering unexpected losses. 
A system of provisions such as this is certainly superior to the possible use of capital 
adequacy ratios to manage the effects of business cycles. Instead, capital adequacy requirements 
should focus on long-term solvency criteria rather than on cyclical performance. In so far as 
developing countries are likely to face more macroeconomic volatility, there may be an argument 
for requiring higher capital/asset ratios (see additional arguments below), but there is none for 
requiring that capital adequacy requirements should not be, as such, counter-cyclical.  
In any case, it should also be borne in mind, once again, that stricter standards in developing 
countries for the management of macroeconomic risks —in terms of provisions, capital or other 
variables— increase the costs of financial intermediation, thereby reducing international 
competitiveness and creating arbitrage incentives to use international financial intermediation as an 
alternative. Also, prudential policies are certainly not a substitute for the risks that pro-cyclical 
macroeconomic policies may generate. 
C. Prudential treatment of currency and maturity risks, and 
volatile asset prices 
Experience indicates that currency and maturity mismatches are essential aspects of financial 
crises in developing countries. Prudential regulation should thus establish strict rules to prevent 
currency mismatches (including those associated with hedging and related operations) and to reduce 
imbalances between the maturities of assets and liabilities of financial intermediaries. In addition, 
liquidity regulations should be established to manage such imbalances. 
The strict prohibition of currency mismatches in the portfolios of financial intermediaries is 
the best rule. Authorities should, additionally, closely monitor the intermediation of short-term 
external credits. As we have seen, currency risk of non-financial firms, particularly those operating 
in non-tradables sectors, may eventually turn into credit risk for banks.12 This fact points up the 
need for better monitoring of the currency risks of these firms and, probably, for specific 
                                                 
12  For an analysis of the risks associated with non-tradables sectors, see Rojas-Suárez (2001). 
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regulations on lending to firms in non-tradables sectors with substantial liabilities in foreign 
currency. In particular, regulations can be used to establish more stringent provisions and/or risk 
weighting for those operations, or a strict prohibition on lending in foreign currencies to non-
financial firms with no income in those currencies; capital account regulations would have to 
establish complementary norms for direct borrowing abroad by these firms (see above). 
In addition, prudential regulation needs to ensure adequate levels of liquidity for financial 
intermediaries so that they can handle the mismatch between the average maturities of assets and 
liabilities inherent in the financial system’s essential function of transforming maturities, which 
generates risks associated with volatility in deposits and/or interest rates. This underscores the fact 
that liquidity and solvency problems are far more closely interrelated than traditionally assumed, 
particularly in the face of macroeconomic shocks. Reserve requirements, which are strictly an 
instrument of monetary policy, provide liquidity in many countries, but their declining importance 
makes it necessary to find new tools. Moreover, their traditional structure is not geared to the 
specific objective of ensuring financial intermediaries’ liquidity in the face of the inherent maturity 
mismatches they hold in their portfolios. An important innovation in this area was the Argentine 
system created in 1995, which set liquidity requirements based on the residual maturity of financial 
institutions’ liabilities (i.e., the number of days remaining before reaching maturity).13 These 
liquidity requirements —or a system of reserve requirements with similar characteristics— have the 
additional advantage that they offer a direct incentive to the financial system to maintain an 
appropriate liability structure. The quality of the assets with which liquidity requirements are met is 
obviously a crucial factor. In this regard, it must be pointed out that allowing such assets to be 
invested in public-sector bonds was an essential weakness of the Argentine system, as it increased 
the vulnerability of the financial system to public-sector debt restructuring, a risk that materialized 
in 2001. 
The valuation of assets used as collateral for loans also presents problems when those assets 
exhibit price volatility because, in many cases, ex-ante assessments may be significantly higher than 
ex-post prices. Limits on loan-to-value ratios and rules to adjust the values of collateral for cyclical 
price variations should be adopted. One approach in this direction is the “mortgage lending value”, 
a valuation procedure applied in some European countries, which reflects long-term market trends 
in real estate prices based on past experience (European Central Bank, 2000). 
The proposal for a new Basle accord attempts to align risk weights with the evaluations of 
external credit rating agencies. Unfortunately, this would introduce an additional pro-cyclical bias, 
given the pro-cyclical pattern of credit ratings (Reisen, 2002). The high concentration of the rating 
industry is an additional argument against adopting this recommendation. Moreover, it would be 
difficult to apply this practice in developing countries due to the absence of adequate credit ratings 
for most firms. 
 
 
                                                 
13  Banco Central de la República Argentina, 1995. 
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IV. Conclusions 
This chapter has explored the complementary use of two 
instruments to manage capital-account volatility in developing 
countries: capital-account regulations and counter-cyclical prudential 
regulation of domestic financial intermediaries. These instruments 
should be seen as a complement to counter-cyclical macroeconomic 
policies and, certainly, neither of them can nullify the risks that  
pro-cyclical macroeconomic policies may generate. 
Overall, innovative experiences with capital-account regulations 
in the 1990s indicate that they can provide useful instruments in terms 
of both improving debt profiles and facilitating the adoption of 
(possibly temporary) counter-cyclical macroeconomic policies. The 
main advantages of the price-based unremunerated reserve 
requirement pioneered by Chile and Colombia are its simplicity,  
non-discretionary character and neutral effect on corporate borrowing 
decisions. The more quantitative-type Malaysian system has been 
shown to have stronger short-term macroeconomic effects. Traditional 
quantitative exchange controls may be superior if the objective  
of macroeconomic policy is to significantly reduce domestic 
macroeconomic sensitivity to international capital flows. 
Prudential regulation and supervision can, in part, be substituted 
for these direct regulations on the capital account. The main problem 
with these options is that they have, at best, indirect effects on the 
foreign-currency liabilities of non-financial agents and may encourage 
them to borrow directly abroad. Accordingly, they need to be supplemented 
with other disincentives for external borrowing by those firms. 
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Unremunerated reserve requirements may thus be a superior alternative and may be simpler to 
administer. In the case of the public sector, direct regulation of external borrowing should be 
combined with a strategy aimed at developing domestic bond markets. 
Prudential regulation and supervision should take into account not only the microeconomic 
risks, but also the macroeconomic risks associated with boom-bust cycles. In particular, instruments 
need to be designed that will introduce a counter-cyclical element into prudential regulation and 
supervision. More specifically, we argue for a regulatory approach that involves a mix of: 
(a) forward-looking provisions for latent risks, with provisions to be made when credit is granted on 
the basis of the credit risks that are expected throughout the full business cycle (this is the approach 
adopted by the Spanish authorities), and (b) more discrete counter-cyclical prudential provisions, to 
be applied by the regulatory authority to the financial system a whole, or by the supervisory 
authority for special financial institutions, on the basis of objective criteria (e.g., the growth rate of 
credit, or the growth of credit for specific, risky activities). Capital adequacy requirements should 
focus on long-term solvency criteria and should not be, as such, counter-cyclical, but it may be 
advisable for countries facing strong cyclical fluctuations to establish higher capital/asset ratios. 
A system of counter-cyclical prudential regulation and supervision should be complemented 
by regulations in other areas. In particular, prudential regulation should establish strict rules to 
prevent currency mismatches (including those incurred by firms operating in non-tradables sectors 
when borrowing in foreign currency), liquidity requirements and limits on loan-to-collateral-value 
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